የኢትዮጵያና የግብፅ ውጥረት በናይል ወንዝ፡ ከዓለም አቀፍ ሕግ አንጻር

 

 

1)  መግብያ

ኢትዮጵያ በተፈጥሮ ፀጋ የተከበበች ውብ ሀገር ብትሆንም በድህነት አዘቅት ውስጥ ተዘፍቃ የምትኖር፤ባደጉ ሀገራት ተረፈ ምርትና የአየር ብክለት ገፈት ቀማሽነት፤በሚጠጣ ንጹህ ውኃ እጥረት ተጠቂነት የምትነሳ ሀገር ነች፡፡ ኢትዮጵያ በመአድን፣ በለም መሬት፣ በእንስሳት፣ በውኃ ኃብት እንዲሁም በሌሎች አላቂና አላቂ ያልሆኑ የተፈጥሮ ሀብቶች ባለፀጋ መሆኗን የሚካድ ባይሆንም በተፈጥሮ የታደለችውን ኃብት ጥቅም ላይ ከማዋል ረገድ ግን እምብዛም አይደለችም፡፡ ሜዳዋንና ተራሯን የሚሸፍን የተፈጥሮ ዝናብ እየተቀበለች ይህ ዝናብ አፈሯንና ወርቋን ጠራርጎ በመውሰድ ለጎረቤት ሀገራት ነፃ ስጦታና ችሮታ እንዲሆን ከመፍቀድ ውጪ የልማት መንገዱን አልተገለጠላትም፡፡ ወንዞች በደራሽ ውኃ ተጥለቅልቀው የገበሬ ማሳ የጎርፍ ሲሳይ ሲያደርጉ ማየት ክረምት በመጣ ቁጥር የምንገነዘበው መራራ እውነት ነው፡፡ አባይን የሚያክል ግዙፍ የውሀ ኃብት ከጉሮሮዋ እየፈለቀቁ የራሳቸው ከርሰ ምድር ሲሞሉ ኢትዮጵያ  የበይ ተመልካች ሆና መኖሯን ግርምት ይፈጥራል፡፡

ናይል የሚባለው የአለም ረዥሙ ወንዝ ላይ ያለው ውኃ 85%ቱ የኢትዮጵያ ነው፡፡ ይሁንና ከ50% በላይ የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ኑሮውን በኩራዝ መብራት ይመራል፡፡ ይህ ክስተት ወገብን ይቆርጣል፡፡ ”ከሞኝ ደጃፍ ሞፈር ይቆረጣል” እንዲሉ ግብፅ በናይል ወንዝ ላይ 5% እንኳን አስተዋፅኦ ሳታደርግ በምስራቅም በምእራብም የዚሁ ወንዝ ብቸኛ አለቃ ነኝ በማለት በሌሎች የናይል ተፋሰስ ሀገራት ላይ የምትሰነዝረው ዛቻና ማስፈራርያ የሚያስገርም ነው፡፡ የናይል ወንዝ ብቸኛ ባለቤት እንደሆነች በመግለፅ አሁናዊ ተጠቃሚነቷን የሚነካ ማንኛውም አይነት እንቅስቃሴ የደም መስዋእትነት ለመክፈል ዝግጁ እንደሆነች በተለያዩ አጋጣሚዎች ስትገልፅ መስማት የተለመደ ሆኗል፡፡ ሆኖም ኢትዮጵያ የግብፅ ሽለላና ቀረርቶ ጆሮ ዳባ ልበስ በማለት በግዛታዊ ክልሏ ውስጥ በሚገኝ በጥቁር አባይ ላይ ታላቁ የህዳሴ ግድብ ግንባታ ጀምራ ከ70% በላይ ማድረሷን ይታወቃል፡፡ በሌላ በኩል ይህ ግድብ ለግብፅ ራስ ምታት እንደሆነባት፤ኢትዮጵያ የያዘቸውን የልማት መንገድ ለማደናቀፍም ያልፈነቀለችው ድንጋይ እንደሌለ፤በቀጣይም የማትቆፍረው ጉድጓድ እንደማይኖር ኢትዮጵያውያን የምንገነዘበው እውነት ነው፡፡ የናይል ወንዝ በግብፅና በኢትዮጵያ መካከል የፈጠረውን ውጥረት በተለያዩ ወቅቶች የውጭና የሀገር ውስጥ ሚድያዎች ርእሰ ዜና በመሆን የአለም አቀፉ ማህበረሰብ ቀልብ መሳብ የቻለ፤አሁንም ውጥረቱ በስምምነት ያልተቋጨ ክስተት ሆኖ ቀጥሏል፡፡

Continue reading
  7422 Hits

Have you heard about the Budapest Memorandum? It’s Totally Worthless

Speaking of the current Russia-Ukraine crisis, here is an interesting but less visible international legal dimension to the story.

Ukraine used to be part of the Soviet Union, during which time it had possessed huge stockpile of nuclear weapons arsenal – actually the third largest stockpile in the world at the time. Russia would not have ventured into Crimea today had Ukraine maintained possession of those nuclear weapons. What happened in 1994 was dramatic, and a bit embarrassing for Ukraine. At the end of the Cold War Ukraine agreed to an international deal that would deprive it of the entire nuclear weapon stockpile in its territory, mostly being transferred to Russia. In exchange, Russia, the US, and UK signed a binding pledge, the so-called Budapest Memorandum, guaranteeing the security of Ukraine. Now, what is interesting about this Memorandum is that it actually contained zero added-value as it offered Ukraine nothing other than what general international law already provided. Let me walk you through all the five articles of this Memorandum (yes it contained only five articles).

Article one states that Russia, USA and UK reaffirm their commitment to ‘to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine’. Why is this promise useless? Because article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which has since become customary international law and even arguably a peremptory norm, already prohibits states from using ‘the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.’ Respecting the territory, independence and sovereignty of Ukraine is a customary international rule, and no additional treaty is needed for that.

Article two of the Memorandum basically repeats the above point, stating that the three powerful states will ‘refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine’, and adds that ‘none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.’ This article seems to waste two clauses to say one and the same thing: what is the difference between ‘refraining from threatening or attacking’ another country and promising one’s ‘weapons won’t be used against’ such other country?  Or the difference between saying ‘I will not attack you’ and ‘none of my equipment will be used to attack you’?  One may say the first formulation concerns the actions of the attacker only while the later formulation creates responsibility on such party for the consequences of its weapons, by whomever the weapons may be used. That is to say, the first clause guarantees Russia, USA, and UK wont attack Ukraine, while the subsequent clause guarantees that the nuclear weapons of these states won’t be used by themselves or any other state against Ukraine. In either case, in as long as the Memorandum only envisages scenarios where the three states would have some control over the use of their nuclear weapons, either by themselves or through proxies, the general international law prohibition on the treat or use of force adequately covers it. A state would be held through the rules of state responsibility even if it uses other states (or non-state actors for that matter) as its proxy to attack another state. In sum, in article two of the Memorandum, Russia, USA, and UK promised not to attack Ukraine – but international law would not have allowed them to even if they had not made that promise.

Article three of the Memorandum guarantees that Russia, USA, and UK would ‘refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty.’ This seems to offer something distinct. Although unacceptable, there is no concrete rule under international law that prohibits the use of economic coercion against states (during the preparation of the UN Charter economic coercion was proposed to be prohibited together with the threat or use of force, but the proposal was rejected). However, the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords) to which Ukraine and the three powerful states are members already prohibits the use of economic coercion against states. Article three of the Budapest Memorandum, therefore, is simply redundant.

Continue reading
  10756 Hits

ዓባይ ከቅኝ ገዥዎችና ከዓለም አቀፍ ሕግ አንፃር

 

 

ሳፔቶ ሩባቲኖ የተባለ ኩባንያን በማቋቋም ወዲያው የባህር ንግዱን ማጧጧፍ ጀመረ፡፡ ከአሥራ ሁለት ዓመታት በኋላ የኢጣሊያ መንግሥት የጂቡቲን ጠረፋማ አካባቢ እንዲሁ በገንዘብ በመግዛት ከራስ ዱሜራ እስከ ራስ አሊ ከተቆጣጠረችው ፈረንሣይ ጋር ለመሻማት ኩባንያውን ከነካፒታሉ በመግዛት የአሰብን ጠረፋማ አካባቢዎች ተቆጣጠረ፡፡

በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ ግብፅን ስታስተዳድር የነበረችው እንግሊዝ ሱዳን ላይ የተቀሰቀሰውን ኃይለኛ የሙስሊም መሠረታውያን (ፋንዳሜንታሊስቶች) አብዮት ለመከላከል ሁነኛ አጋር ሆና እንድትቆምላት ኢጣሊያ ከቆላማዎቹ የቀይ ባህር አካባቢዎች በመነሳት ወደ ደጋማው የኢትዮጵያ ግዛት (ኤርትራ) ግዛቷን እንድታስፋፋ አበረታታቻት፡፡

ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ የሱዳን ሙስሊም ፋንዳሜንታሊስቶች በሱዳን ምሥራቃዊ ክፍል የመሸገውን ለእንግሊዝ ያደረ የግብፅ ጦር በመክበብ በውኃ ጥም ሊፈጁት ሆነ፡፡ 

Continue reading
  10241 Hits

Do institutions really matter?

This essay attempts to address the undue focus on the lessened role of institutions on security issues while ignoring their (institutions) achievements in many other issue-areas so as to let them be conceived as weak instruments of international relations.Thomson and Snidal (1999), in their article International Organization have cited a lot of authorities witnessing that the application of institution has been expanded to a wide variety of issue-areas, including international security, trade, finance, telecommunications, and the environment. International legal scholars have also increasingly used institutions to better understand issues such as international trade laws, arms control agreements, and the law of treaties.

Problem of defining ‘institution’

One of the problems in this area is that scholars do not agree on the definition of the term institution. A widely adhered ‘standard’ definition by S. Krasner (1983) presents regimes/institutions as sets of implicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. However, scholars like Mearsheimer, in his article entitled false promise of international institutions do not agree on this definition. Even he mocks that Krasner’s definition lacks analytical bite. Strange (1982) has also criticized it as vague. They have, instead, provided their own definitions. Nevertheless, the way Krasner defines institutions enables us to assess the role of institutions in almost all walks of life. The definition makes up Regime Theory that premises: international politics is highly interdependent (Keohane and Nye, 1977) implying mutual interests in cooperation and (b) international behavior is institutionalized in a variety of ways (Ruggie, 1975).

Main scholars and theories said on the score

Mearsheimer (p.8) derisively wrote that institutionalists consider institutions to be a powerful force for stability. R. Keohane, for example, declares that, avoiding military conflict in Europe after the Cold War depends greatly on whether period is characterized by a continuous pattern of institutionalized cooperation. Commenting on the aftermath of the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War, John Ruggie maintains that there seems little doubt that multilateral norms and institutions have helped stabilize their international consequences. Indeed, such norms and institutions appear to be playing a significant role in the management of a broad array of regional and global changes in the world system today.

Continue reading
  6007 Hits